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ARROW UPDATE LOGIC
BARTELD KOOI AND BRYAN RENNE
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen
Abstract. We present Arrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be
used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow
Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular
Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more
succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought
of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow
Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to
proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge
that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar
from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.
§1. Introduction. Public Announcement Logic is a modal logic theory for reasoning
about multi-agent belief changes brought about by completely trustworthy announcements.
This logic generally comes in two flavors: Plaza’s (1989, 2007) logic, in which a public
announcement of a statement eliminates all epistemic possibilities in which the statement
does not hold, and Gerbrandy & Groeneveld’s (1997) logic, in which a public announce-
ment of a statement merely eliminates access to all epistemic possibilities in which the
statement does not hold. The most popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), due to Baltag
et al. (1998) or “BMS” (see also Baltag & Moss, 2004; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007),
generalizes Plaza’s logic by eliminating epistemic possibilities that do not satisfy certain
preconditions. However, many examples of epistemic or doxastic update are naturally
thought of in terms of merely eliminating access to such possibilities.
In this paper, we present Arrow Update Logic (AUL), a theory of epistemic access
elimination that generalizes Gerbrandy and Groeneveld’s logic of public announcements.
AUL is inspired by the arrow precondition language proposed by Renne et al. (2009, 2010);
there are also connections to the work of Renardel de Lavalette (2004) and of Aucher et al.
(2009) on accessibility relation change and to the work of van Benthem (2005) on arbitrary
arrow elimination.
In the Arrow Update Logic we present in this paper, we shall restrict ourselves to very
simple arrow updates in which epistemic arrows are merely eliminated; no new arrows
will be created. Accordingly, while agents may have different beliefs and different ways
of processing incoming information, it is common knowledge among the agents how each
agent will process the incoming information. We will revisit this restriction at the end of
the paper.
To motivate Arrow Update Logic, we observe that it is natural to think of certain belief
changes in terms of eliminating arrows. For example, let us consider a van Ditmarsch
(2000) card-playing scenario: the cards r, w, and b are dealt to agents 1, 2, and 3, one card
per agent. A Kripke model M representing this situation is pictured on the left in Figure 1.
Received: August 2, 2011.
c© Association for Symbolic Logic, 2011
536 doi:10.1017/S1755020311000189
ARROW UPDATE LOGIC 537
Fig. 1. Kripke models for agents 1 (solid), 2 (dashed), and 3 (dotted).
In this picture, each world is labeled by an expression c1c2c3, which represents the deal in
which agent 1 is dealt card c1 ∈ {r, w, b}, agent 2 is dealt card c2 ∈ {r, w, b}, and agent
3 is dealt card c3 ∈ {r, w, b}. Solid arrows are reserved for agent 1, dashed arrows for
agent 2, and dotted arrows for agent 3. To have an agent’s arrow point between two worlds
means that the agent in question cannot distinguish between the deals represented by the
two worlds.
Now suppose that all the agents look at their own cards, an action we denote by pickup.
After this action, it is common knowledge that each agent knows her own card but does
not know the cards of the other agents. We represent the situation after this action using a
Kripke model M ∗ pickup pictured on the right in Figure 1.
Note that a natural way to obtain M ∗ pickup from M is to simply delete arrows. To
specify which arrows to delete, we can simply say which arrows are to remain, with the
understanding that all other arrows are to be deleted. To say that an agent-a arrow from
world w to world w′ should remain, we will use a triple of the form (ϕ, a, ψ), where the
expression ϕ describes a condition to be satisfied by the source world w, the expression a
names the agent, and the expression ψ describes a condition to be satisfied by the target
world w′. We collect together a number of such arrow specifications in the set pickup
defined by
pickup def= {(ca, a, ca) | c ∈ {r, w, b} and a ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ,
where ca is the condition “agent a has card c.” The set pickup describes all arrows that
connect worlds in which an agent has the same card. Intuitively, after the agents look at
their cards, only the arrows described by pickup should remain: each agent knows her own
card (and hence we should delete arrows between worlds in which her card is different
because she can distinguish these worlds), but she does not know the cards of the others
(and hence we should maintain arrows between worlds in which she has the same card
but the others’ cards may be different because she cannot distinguish these worlds). The
basic idea we put forward in this paper is that a finite set of triples such as pickup is an
arrow-changing prescription called an arrow update that can be reasoned about within a
doxastic modal logic. We develop such a logic and call it AUL.
After presenting the language and semantics (Section §2) and the axiomatics (Sec-
tion §3) of AUL, we show that arrow updates can be transformed into DEL action models
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(Section §4). We work out a number of examples of arrow updates (Section §5) and then
prove our key result: arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action
models (Section §6). We then outline a common knowledge extension of AUL called AUL∗
(Section §7), and conclude with directions for further research.
§2. Language and semantics.
DEFINITION 2.1 (Agents, Propositional Variables). We fix a nonempty finite set A of
agents, and we fix an at most countable set P of propositional variables.
DEFINITION 2.2 (AUL Language). Grammar G is defined as follows.
ϕ ::= ⊥ |  | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 2aϕ | [U ]ϕ
U ::= (ϕ, a, ϕ) | (ϕ, a, ϕ),U
p ∈ P , a ∈ A
We will often omit parentheses around expressions when doing so ought not cause confu-
sion. Expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G are called AUL-formulas
(or just formulas); we let F denote the set of formulas. Given formulas ϕ and ϕ′ and an
agent a ∈ A , the syntactic object (ϕ, a, ϕ′) is called an a-arrow specification (or just an
arrow specification) and is said to have source condition ϕ, label a, and target condition ϕ′.
Expressions built using U as a start symbol in grammar G are called AUL-arrow updates
(or just arrow updates); we let U denote the set of arrow updates. We identify an arrow
update U ∈ U with the finite nonempty set of arrow specifications defined by writing set-
formation brackets around U. Expressions written using propositional connectives other
than ∧ and ¬ are to be understood as abbreviations for formulas in the usual way. Given
an agent a ∈ A , an arrow update U ∈ U , and a formula ϕ ∈ F , the expression
3aϕ abbreviates the formula ¬2a¬ϕ and the expression 〈U 〉ϕ abbreviates the formula
¬[U ]¬ϕ. An update modal is an expression [U ] for which U ∈ U . To say that a formula
is reduced means that the formula does not contain update modals.
The formula 2aϕ is assigned the informal reading “agent a believes ϕ.” The formula
[U ]ϕ is assigned the informal reading “after arrow update U , formula ϕ is true.”
The AUL language is interpreted on Kripke models.
DEFINITION 2.3 (Kripke Model). To say that M is a Kripke model means that M is
a tuple (W M , RM , V M ) consisting of a nonempty set W M of worlds in M, a function
RM : A × W M → ℘(W M ) mapping each agent–world pair (a, w) ∈ A × W M to a
set RMa (w) ∈ ℘(W M ) of worlds in M, and a function V M : P → ℘(W ) mapping each
propositional variable p ∈ P to a set V M (p) ∈ ℘(W M ) of worlds in M. A pointed
Kripke model is a pair (M, w) consisting of a Kripke model M and a world w ∈ W M ; the
world w is called the point of (M, w).
Given a Kripke model M and an agent a ∈ A , the function RMa induces the binary
relation R¯Ma
def= {(w,w′) | w′ ∈ RMa (w)} on W M . The members of R¯Ma are called
a-arrows.
DEFINITION 2.4 (AUL Semantics). Given a pointed Kripke model (M, w) and a formula
ϕ, we write M, w | ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at (M, w), and we write M, w | ϕ for the
negation of M, w | ϕ. The relation | is defined by the following induction on formula
construction.
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M, w | ⊥ and M, w | 
M, w | p iff w ∈ V M (p) for p ∈ P
M, w | ¬ϕ iff M, w | ϕ
M, w | ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w | ϕ and M, w | ψ
M, w | 2aϕ iff M, v | ϕ for each v ∈ RMa (w)
M, w | [U ]ϕ iff (M ∗ U ), w | ϕ
W M∗U def= W M
RM∗Ua (v)
def= {v ′ ∈ RMa (v) | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U :
(M, v | ϕ and M, v ′ | ϕ′)}
V M∗U (p) def= V M (p)
To say that a formula ϕ is valid in a Kripke model M, written M | ϕ, means that M, w |
ϕ for each world w ∈ W M . To say that a formula ϕ is valid, written | ϕ, means that
M | ϕ for each Kripke model M. The negation of | ϕ is written | ϕ.
To see how the semantics works, consider our card example from the previous section.
We define the set A of agents, the set C of cards, the set P of propositional variables, the
Kripke model M , and the arrow update pickup as follows.
A
def= {1, 2, 3}
C def= {r, w, b}
P
def= {ca | c ∈ C and a ∈ A }




def= {w ∈ W M | w(a) = c}
pickup def= {(ca, a, ca) | c ∈ C and a ∈ A }
For convenience, we identify each function w ∈ W M with the expression w(1)w(2)w(3).
Hence rwb ∈ W M is the function of type A → C satisfying rwb(1) = r, rwb(2) = w,
rwb(3) = b. Model M is pictured on the left in Figure 1.
Assuming that “rwb” is the deal, let us check that agent 1 believes that she has card
r after the agents pick up their cards. That is, we verify that M, rwb | [pickup]21r1 .
Proceeding, it follows by the definition of M ∗ pickup that
RM∗pickup1 (rwb) = {w ∈ W M | w(1) = r} ,
from which it follows that M ∗ pickup, rwb | 21r1 . (Model M ∗ pickup is pictured on
the right in Figure 1.) But then it follows by the semantics that M, rwb | [pickup]21r1 ,
as desired.
§3. Theory. In this section, we define an axiomatic theory called AUL that is sound
and complete with respect to the semantics from the previous section. The completeness
proof follows the reduction axiom method of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Baltag & Moss,
2004; Baltag et al., 1998; Gerbrandy, 1999; Plaza, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2006; van
Ditmarsch et al., 2007). Before we define the theory AUL, we first introduce a notion of
arrow update composition.
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AXIOM SCHEMES
CL. Classical Propositional Logic
BK. 2a(ϕ → ψ) → (2aϕ → 2aψ)
U1. [U ]q ↔ q for q ∈ P ∪ {⊥,}
U2. [U ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[U ]ϕ
U3. [U ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ)
U4. [U ]2aϕ ↔∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → 2a(χ → [U ]ϕ))
U5. [U ][U ′]ϕ ↔ [U ◦ U ′]ϕ
RULES









Table 1. The theory AUL
DEFINITION 3.1 (Composition). Let U and U ′ be arrow updates. The composition of U
with U ′, written U ◦ U ′, is the arrow update defined by setting
U ◦ U ′ def= {(ϕ ∧ [U ]ϕ′, a, ψ ∧ [U ]ψ ′) | ∃(ϕ, a, ψ) ∈ U and ∃(ϕ′, a, ψ ′) ∈ U ′}.
DEFINITION 3.2 (AUL Theory). The axiomatic theory AUL is defined in Table 1. We write
AUL  ϕ (or sometimes just  ϕ) to mean that the formula ϕ is derivable in the axiomatic
theory AUL; the negation of AUL  ϕ is written AUL  ϕ (or sometimes just  ϕ). To
say that a set S ⊆ F of formulas is AUL-inconsistent (or just inconsistent) means that
there is a finite subset S′ ⊆ S such that  ¬∧ S′, where ∧ S′ def= ∧ϕ∈S′ ϕ if S′ = ∅ and∧
ϕ∈∅ ϕ
def= . To say that a set of formulas is AUL-consistent (or just consistent) means
that the set is not inconsistent. Consistency or inconsistency of a formula refers to the
consistency or inconsistency of the singleton set containing the formula.
Axioms U1–U5 are called reduction axioms. When reading these axioms from left to
right, we note that the “complexity” of the formulas to which the update modal applies
decreases; in U1, the update modal is eliminated entirely. As for the intuitive meanings
of the reduction axioms, U1 says that atomic facts about the world do not change due to
arrow updates. U2 expresses the fact that arrow updates are functional: there is only one
way that an arrow update can update a Kripke model. U3 says that arrow updates distribute
over conjunction. U4 characterizes an agent’s beliefs after an arrow update in terms of her
beliefs before the update: a believes ϕ after arrow update U if and only if [U ]ϕ is true in
all of the worlds that can be reached by an a-arrow satisfying an a-arrow specification in
U .1 Axiom U5 says that the effect of a sequence of two arrow updates is equivalent to the
effect of their composition.
THEOREM 3.3 (AUL Soundness). AUL  ϕ implies | ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F .
1 To say that an a-arrow (w,w′) ∈ R¯Ma in a Kripke model M satisfies an a-arrow specification
(ϕ, a, ϕ) means that the source condition ϕ is true at (M, w) and the target condition ϕ′ is true at
(M, w′).
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Proof. By induction on the length of derivation in AUL. We restrict our attention to
the base cases for Axioms U4 and U5; the other cases are straightforward. We begin
with the proof that the left-to-right implication of Axiom U4 is valid. Proceeding, choose
an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) satisfying M, w | [U ]2aϕ and choose an
arbitrary a-arrow (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U such that M, w | ψ . It follows by the semantics that for
each v ∈ RM∗Ua (w), we have (M ∗U ), v | ϕ. But the latter is equivalent to the following:
for each v ∈ RMa (w) for which ∃(ψ ′, a, χ ′) ∈ U such that M, w | ψ ′ and M, v | χ ′, we
have that M, v | [U ]ϕ. Therefore, if we have M, w′ | χ for a world w′ ∈ RMa (w), then,
since (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U and we assumed that M, w | ψ , it follows that M, w′ | [U ]ϕ and
hence that M, w′ | χ → [U ]ϕ. We have therefore shown that M, w | 2a(χ → [U ]ψ)
and hence that M, w | ψ → 2a(χ → [U ]ψ). Conclusion: the left-to-right implication
of Axiom U4 is valid. Let us now argue that the right-to-left implication is valid. Choose
an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) satisfying
M, w |∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → 2a(χ → [U ]ϕ)) . (1)
To prove that M, w | [U ]2aϕ, it suffices for us to show that M, v | [U ]ϕ for each
v ∈ RM∗Ua (w). So choose an arbitrary v ∈ RM∗Ua (w). It follows by the definition of RM∗Ua
that v ∈ RMa (w) and ∃(ψ, a, χ) ∈ U such that M, w | ψ and M, v | χ . But then it
follows by assumption (1) that M, v | [U ]ϕ, as desired. Conclusion: Axiom U4 is valid.
We now turn to the base case for Axiom U5. We will show that the axiom is sound by
showing that (M ∗U )∗U ′ = M ∗ (U ◦U ′) for any Kripke model M . It is clear that the sets
of possible worlds of these models are identical and so are the valuations. So it remains
to be shown that for all worlds w and agents a that R(M∗U )∗U
′
a (w) = RM∗(U◦U
′)
a (w).
Take an arbitrary w and a and suppose that v ∈ R(M∗U )∗U ′a (w) for some v . Therefore
v ∈ RM∗Ua (w) and there is an arrow specification (ϕ′, a, ψ ′) ∈ U ′ such that M∗U, w | ϕ′
and M∗U, v | ψ ′. So M, w | [U ]ϕ′ and M, v | [U ]ψ ′. Moreover we can conclude that
v ∈ RMa (w) and there must also be an arrow specification (ϕ, a, ψ) ∈ U such that M, w |
ϕ and M, v | ψ . Therefore M, w | ϕ∧[U ]ϕ′ and M, v | ψ∧[U ]ψ ′. By Definition 3.1,
we have (ϕ∧ [U ]ϕ′, a, ψ ∧ [U ]ψ ′) ∈ U ◦U ′ and hence v ∈ RM∗(U◦U ′)a (w). This argument
also works the other way around. Therefore R(M∗U )∗U
′
a (w) = RM∗(U◦U
′)
a (w), and so (M ∗
U ) ∗ U ′ = M ∗ (U ◦ U ′).
Now choose an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) and suppose that M, w |
[U ][U ′]ϕ. Hence M∗U | [U ′]ϕ and (M∗U )∗U ′, w | ϕ. Therefore M∗(U ◦U ′), w | ϕ
and so M, w | [U ◦ U ′]ϕ. The argument also holds the other way around. Hence Axiom
U5 is valid. 
Our proof of the completeness of AUL generally follows the proof in Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007). In particular, we begin by defining a notion of
formula and arrow update “complexity” and then prove by induction on the complexity
of formulas that every formula is provably equivalent to a reduced (i.e., update modal-
free) formula. This allows us to reduce the completeness of AUL to the completeness of
its underlying multimodal logic K (AUL without U1–U5 and UN and applied to reduced
formulas only).
DEFINITION 3.4 (AUL Complexity). We define a function c : (F ∪ U ) → N as follows.
c(q) def= 1 for q ∈ P ∪ {⊥,}
c(¬ϕ) def= 1 + c(ϕ)
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c(ϕ ∧ ψ) def= 1 + max{c(ϕ), c(ψ)}
c(2aϕ)
def= 1 + c(ϕ)
c([U ]ϕ) def= (c(U ) + 2) · c(ϕ)
c
({(ϕ, a, ϕ′)}) def= 1 + max{c(ϕ), c(ϕ′)}
c
({(ϕ, a, ϕ′),U }) def= 1 + max{c(ϕ), c(ϕ′), c(U )}
For each X ∈ F ∪ U , the number c(X) is called the complexity of X.
THEOREM 3.5 (AUL Reduction). For each ϕ ∈ F , there is a reduced r(ϕ) ∈ F such that
AUL  ϕ ↔ r(ϕ).
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulas, one can show that the equations in
Table 2 define a function r : F → F . To show this, one of the key results that one must
argue is that the equations in Table 2 are complexity respecting, by which we mean that r
is applied on the left side of an equation to a syntactic object whose complexity is strictly
greater than any syntactic object on the right side of the equation to which r is applied.
Arguing the equations are complexity respecting is a tedious exercise in reasoning with
inequalities; we only prove that c([U ][U ′]ϕ) > c([U ◦ U ′]ϕ). We have the following.
c(U ◦ U ′)
= 1 + max
(ϕ,a,ψ)∈U,(ϕ′,a,ψ ′)∈U ′
{c(ϕ ∧ [U ]ϕ′), c(ψ ∧ [U ]ψ ′)}
= 2 + max
(ϕ,a,ψ)∈U,(ϕ′,a,ψ ′)∈U ′
{c(ϕ), c(ψ), (c(U ) + 2) · c(ϕ′), (c(U ) + 2) · c(ψ ′)}
≤ 2 + max{c(U ), (c(U ) + 2) · c(U ′)}
= 2 + c(U ) · c(U ′) + 2 · c(U ′)
Hence c([U ◦ U ′]ϕ) ≤ 4 · c(ϕ) + c(U ) · c(U ′) · c(ϕ) + 2 · c(U ′) · c(ϕ). Further, it is easy
to see that c([U ][U ′]ϕ) = c(U ) · c(U ′) · c(ϕ)+ 2 · c(U ) · c(ϕ)+ 2 · c(U ′) · c(ϕ)+ 4 · c(ϕ).
It follows that c([U ][U ′]ϕ) > c([U ◦ U ′]ϕ). To prove the statement of the theorem, one
then argues by induction on the complexity k of formulas that for each formula θ having
c(θ) ≤ k, it follows that  θ ↔ r(θ). The argument is broken up into a number of cases,
one for each of the forms to which r is applied on the left side of an equation in Table 2.
r(q) def= q for q ∈ P ∪ {⊥,}
r(¬ϕ) def= ¬r(ϕ)
r(ϕ ∧ ψ) def= r(ϕ) ∧ r(ψ)
r(2aϕ)
def= 2ar(ϕ)
r([U ]q) def= q for q ∈ P ∪ {⊥,}
r([U ]¬ϕ) def= ¬r([U ]ϕ)
r([U ](ϕ ∧ ψ)) def= r([U ]ϕ) ∧ r([U ]ψ)
r([U ]2aϕ) def= ∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U r(ψ) → 2a(r(χ) → r([U ]ϕ))
r([U ][U ′]ϕ) def= r([U ◦ U ′]ϕ)
Table 2. Definition of r : F → F
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Let us check the induction case for the form [U ]2aϕ. Proceeding, we have
 (∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U ψ → 2a(χ → [U ]ϕ)) ↔ (∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U r(ψ) → 2a(r(χ) → r([U ]ϕ)))
by the induction hypothesis—which is applicable because the equations in Table 2 are com-
plexity respecting—and modal reasoning. By Axiom U4, the definition of r , and propo-
sitional logic, it follows that  [U ]2aϕ ↔ r([U ]2aϕ). The other cases are handled
similarly. 
THEOREM 3.6 (AUL Completeness). | ϕ implies AUL  ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F .
Proof. Suppose we are given an arbitrary ϕ ∈ F satisfying | ϕ. By Soundness
(Theorem 3.3) and Reduction (Theorem 3.5), it follows that | r(ϕ). Since r(ϕ) is reduced,
we have K  r(ψ) by the completeness of the multi-modal logic K (Blackburn et al., 2001)
and hence AUL  r(ϕ) because AUL extends K. Applying Reduction once more, it follows
by propositional reasoning that AUL  ϕ. 
§4. Arrow updates and action models. In this section, we show every arrow update
has the “same effect” as a certain action model of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Devised by
Baltag et al. (1998), an action model is a Kripke model-like object that describes the agents’
beliefs about incoming information. Instead of a set of possible worlds, an action model A
has a set E A of possible “events,” each of which comes with an assertion preA(e), called
the precondition, that might be made. But the agents are uncertain as to which assertion
will in fact be made: given an agent a and an event e, there is a set R Aa (e) of events
whose preconditions the agent thinks might have been asserted whenever the precondition
preA(e) of event e is in fact asserted. In this way, an action model represents a set of
possible events, each of which conveys the information content of a certain assertion, but
the agents are uncertain as to which event is taking place.
DEFINITION 4.1 (Action Model). Let F be a set of formulas. To say that A is an F-action
model means that A is a tuple (E A, R A, preA) consisting of a nonempty finite set E A
whose members will be called events in A, a function R A : A × E A → ℘(E A) mapping
each agent–event pair (a, e) ∈ A × W A to a set R Aa (e) ∈ ℘(W A) of events in A, and a
function preA : E A → F mapping each event e ∈ E A to a formula preA(e) ∈ F called
the precondition of e. A multi-pointed F-action model is a pair (A, E) consisting of an
action model and a set E ⊆ E A of events; each e ∈ E is called a point of (A, E). If F ′ is
a set of formulas, then we write A(F ′) to denote the set of multi-pointed F ′-action models.
The points E of a multi-pointed action model (A, E) represent the set of possible
events that may be executed according to a nondeterministic choice. The language of
DEL is obtained from that of multi-modal logic by adding multi-pointed action modals
as modalities.
DEFINITION 4.2 (DEL Language). We define grammar G0 as follows.
ϕ ::= ⊥ |  | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 2aϕ
p ∈ P , a ∈ A
We define F0 to be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G0.
Then, whenever Fk is defined, we define grammar Gk+1 as follows.
ϕ ::= ψ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 2aϕ | [A, E]ϕ
ψ ∈ Fk , a ∈ A , (A, E) ∈ A(Fk)
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We define Fk+1 to be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar
Gk+1. Finally, we define the set FDEL def=
⋃
k∈NFk whose members will be called DEL-
formulas. We adopt conventions and terminology similar to those established for the AUL
language (Definition 2.2). To say that a DEL-formula ϕ is reduced means ϕ ∈ F0. An
action model is an FDEL-action model. A multi-pointed action model is a multi-pointed
FDEL-action model.
The language of DEL is also interpreted on Kripke models. The core semantic definition
is the so-called product update (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998), which deter-
mines the truth of a formula [A, E]ϕ at a pointed Kripke model (M, w) by constructing a
new Kripke model M[A].
DEFINITION 4.3 (DEL Semantics). Given a pointed Kripke model (M, w) and a DEL-
formula ϕ, we write M, w | ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at (M, w), and we write M, w | ϕ
for the negation of M, w | ϕ. The relation | is defined by the following induction on
DEL-formula construction.
M, w | ⊥ and M, w | 
M, w | p iff w ∈ V M (p) for p ∈ P
M, w | ¬ϕ iff M, w | ϕ
M, w | ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w | ϕ and M, w | ψ
M, w | 2aϕ iff M, v | ϕ for each v ∈ RMa (w)
M, w | [A, E]ϕ iff M, w | preA(e) implies M[A], (w, e) | ϕ for all e ∈ E
W M[A] def= {(v, f ) ∈ W M × E A | M, v | preA( f )}
RM[A]a
(
(v, f )) def= {(v ′, f ′) ∈ W M[A] | v ′ ∈ RMa (v) & f ′ ∈ R Aa ( f )}
V M[A](p) def= {(v, f ) ∈ W M[A] | v ∈ V M (p)}
Validity for DEL-formulas is defined as for AUL-formulas (Definition 2.4).
By Theorem 3.5 and by a similar theorem for DEL (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al.,
1998; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007), AUL and DEL can each be reduced to the underlying
multi-modal logic K, by which we mean that each formula from either system is seman-
tically equivalent to a K-formula. (The K-formulas are just the reduced formulas—the
members of F0.) This tells us that each of AUL and DEL may be viewed as a repackaging
of K. However, things are not so simple: the translation from DEL to K will bring about
an exponential blow-up of certain formulas (Lutz, 2006), and it would be surprising if the
same were not the case for AUL (though whether it is indeed the case is an open question
we leave for future work).
While the common K-link provides one connection between AUL and DEL, we now
wish to study another. In particular, we wish to understand the relationship between AUL’s
arrow updates and DEL’s action models. As a first step in understanding this relationship,
we will show that every arrow update can be transformed into an action model that has
the “same effect.” This relates arrow updates to action models, telling us that every arrow
update is expressible by an action model. An open question for future work is to charac-
terize the reverse expressive relationship: which action models are expressible using arrow
updates?
Our sense of an action model having the “same effect” as an arrow update is given
by the following notion of update equivalence, which is a simple adaptation of a related
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notion of action equivalence from Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Eijck et al., 2008) to the
framework of this paper.
DEFINITION 4.4 (Update Equivalence; adapted from van Eijck et al., 2008). A u-modal
for an action model A is any expression of the form [A, E] for some E ⊆ E A, a u-modal
for a multi-pointed action model (A′, E ′) is the expression [A′, E ′], and a u-modal for an
arrow update U is the expression [U ]. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Xi be either an action model
Ai , a multi-pointed action model (Ai , Ei ) or an arrow update Ui . To say that X1 and X2
are update equivalent means that there is a u-modal [X1] for X1 and there is a u-modal
[X2] for X2 such that, for each pointed Kripke model (M, w) and each reduced formula
ϕ ∈ F0, we have M, w | [X1]ϕ if and only if M, w | [X2]ϕ.
We now prove that every arrow update U can be transformed into an update equivalent
action model A[U ] defined as follows.
DEFINITION 4.5 (Maximal U -Consistency). Given U ∈ U , define (U ) ⊆ F by setting
(U ) def= {ϕ ∈ F | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U } ∪
{ϕ′ ∈ F | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ ′) ∈ U } ,
and define ±(U ) ⊆ F by setting ±(U ) def= (U ) ∪ {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ (U )}. A U -set is a
subset  ⊆ ±(U ). To say that  is maximal U -consistent means that  is a consistent
U-set and any U-set ′ ⊃  is inconsistent.
DEFINITION 4.6 (Action Model A[U ]). Given an arrow update U ∈ U , define the F -
action model A[U ] as follows.
E A[U ] def= { |  is maximal U-consistent}
R A[U ]a ()
def= {′ ∈ E A[U ] | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U : (ϕ ∈  and ϕ′ ∈ ′)}
preA[U ]() def= r (∧)
THEOREM 4.7. For each U ∈ U , the action model A[U ] is update equivalent to U.
Proof. We begin by proving that for each Kripke model M and arrow update U ∈ U ,
the Kripke models M ∗ U and M[A[U ]] are isomorphic.2 Proceeding, fix a Kripke model
M and an arrow update U ∈ U . We first show that for each v ∈ W M , there is a unique




. Proceeding, choose an arbitrary v ∈ W M and let





ϕi if M, v | ϕi ,
¬ϕi if M, v | ϕi .
Defining v
def= {ψvi | i ∈ N & i ≤ n}, it follows by construction, AUL Reduction
(Theorem 3.5), and AUL Soundness (Theorem 3.3) that v is maximal U -consistent and
that M, v | r (∧v). Further, if  ∈ E A[U ] satisfies  = v , then it follows by maximal
2 To say that Kripke models M and M ′ are isomorphic means that there exists an isomorphism
between M and M ′. To say that f is an isomorphism between Kripke models M and M ′ means
that f : W M → W M ′ is a bijection satisfying the property that for each w ∈ W M , we have
that v ∈ RMa (w) if and only if f (v) ∈ RM
′
a ( f (w)) and that w ∈ V M (p) if and only if f (w) ∈
V M ′(p) for each p ∈ P .
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U -consistency that there is a j ∈ N with j ≤ n such that either ϕ j ∈  and ¬ϕ j ∈ v or










To prove the statement of the theorem, define the function f : W M∗U → W M[A[U ]]
by setting f (v) def= (v, v). It follows by what we showed in the previous paragraph that
f is a bijection; in particular, we see that (v, ) ∈ W M[A[U ]] implies M, v | r (∧),
which implies that  = v . Let us now show that we have v ′ ∈ RM∗Ua (v) if and only
if (v ′, v ′) ∈ RM[A[U ]]a ((v, v)). Proceeding, v ′ ∈ RM∗Ua (v) means that v ′ ∈ RMa (v)
and ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ ′) ∈ U such that M, v | ϕ and M, v ′ | ϕ′, which is equivalent to the
statement that v ′ ∈ RMa (v) and ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U such that ϕ ∈ v and ϕ′ ∈ v ′ . But
the latter is equivalent to the statement that v ′ ∈ RMa (v) and v ′ ∈ R A[U ]a (v). Since
M, v | preA[U ](v) and M, v ′ | preA[U ](v ′), the statement at the end of the previous
sentence is equivalent to (v ′, v ′) ∈ RM[A[U ]]a ((v, v)). Hence we have shown that we
have v ′ ∈ RM∗Ua (v) if and only if (v ′, v ′) ∈ RM[A[U ]]a ((v, v)). Finally, we observe
that for each p ∈ P , we have v ∈ V M∗U (p) if and only if v ∈ V M (p) if and only
if (v, v) ∈ V M[A[U ]](p). Conclusion: f is an isomorphism between the Kripke models
M ∗ U and M[A[U ]].
So to prove that A[U ] and U are update equivalent, choose an arbitrary world w ∈
W M and an arbitrary reduced formula ϕ ∈ F0. We have M, w | [U ]ϕ if and only
if M ∗ U, w | ϕ. But f (w) = (w,w) and hence M ∗ U, w | ϕ is equivalent to
M[A[U ]], (w,w) | ϕ because ϕ ∈ F0 and modal truth is invariant under bisimu-
lation (Blackburn et al., 2001) (of which isomorphism is a special case). But we have
M[A[U ]], (w,w) | ϕ if and only if M, w | [A[U ], {w}]ϕ if and only if M, w |
[A[U ], E A[U ]]ϕ by what was shown above. Conclusion: A[U ] and U are update equiva-
lent. 
We note that the construction from Definition 4.6 yields an action model A[U ] that
is exponentially larger than the equivalent arrow update U . In Section §6, we will see
that sometimes it is not possible to avoid this exponential blow-up. Therefore, while the
belief changes described by arrow updates are also describable using action models, arrow
updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models in describing belief
changes.
§5. Examples. In this section, we show how public announcements are captured in
AUL and give an example of a belief change operation whose arrow update implementation
is obvious but whose action model implementation is difficult to discern.
5.1. Public announcements. A public announcement of an assertion ϕ is generally
realized in one of two ways: Plaza’s (2007) operation p(ϕ) that deletes all ¬ϕ-worlds (and
thereby arrows that target such worlds) and Gerbrandy & Groeneveld’s (1997) operation
g(ϕ) that deletes all arrows whose target is a ¬ϕ-world but does not delete any worlds. In
AUL the operation g(ϕ) is implementable using an arrow update we call APUB(ϕ).
DEFINITION 5.1 (Public Announcements). Let M be a Kripke model and ϕ be a formula.
We define the operations p(ϕ) : M → M[ϕ]p and g(ϕ) : M → M[ϕ]g as follows.
W M[ϕ]p def= {w ∈ W M | M, w | ϕ}
RM[ϕ]pa (w)
def= RMa (w) ∩ W M[ϕ]p
V M[ϕ]p(p) def= V M (p) ∩ W M[ϕ]p
W M[ϕ]g def= W M
RM[ϕ]ga (w)
def= RMa (w) ∩ W M[ϕ]p
V M[ϕ]g def= V M
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Fig. 2. The action model A[APUB(ϕ)], where neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is inconsistent.
DEFINITION 5.2 (AUL Public Announcement). Given a formula ϕ, the AUL public an-
nouncement of ϕ is the arrow update APUB(ϕ) defined by setting APUB(ϕ) def= {(, a, ϕ) |
a ∈ A }.
If neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is inconsistent, then A[APUB(ϕ)] (Definition 4.6) is pictured as
in Figure 2. If ¬ϕ is inconsistent, then the picture for A[APUB(ϕ)] is obtained from
that in Figure 2 by deleting node {,¬ϕ} along with the right-to-left A -arrow. If ϕ is
inconsistent, then the picture for A[APUB(ϕ)] is obtained from that in Figure 2 by deleting
node {, ϕ} along with both A -arrows.
It is easy to see that for each Kripke model M and each formula ϕ, we have M[ϕ]g =
M[APUB(ϕ)]. Hence APUB(ϕ) implements the Gerbrandy–Groeneveld operation g(ϕ).
It will therefore be convenient to establish the following notational abbreviation.
DEFINITION 5.3. [ϕ]gψ abbreviates [APUB(ϕ)]ψ for formulas ϕ and ψ .
To describe Plaza’s announcements using Gerbrandy and Groeneveld’s announcements
(and hence using arrow updates), let FPUB be the set of all formulas that can be formed af-
ter we extend the AUL-formula formation grammar G (Definition 2.2) by adding
the following formula formation rule: from formulas ϕ and ψ , form the formula [ϕ]pψ .
The definition of the semantical relation | for FPUB-formulas is obtained by extending
the semantics for AUL-formulas (Definition 2.4) by adding the following inductive clause
(Plaza, 2007; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007).
M, w | [ϕ]pψ iff
(
M, w | ϕ implies M[ϕ]p, w | ψ
) (2)
Note that in the above equivalence, the expression [ϕ]pψ on the left-hand side is a formula
and the expression M[ϕ]p on the right-hand side is the Kripke model defined in Defini-
tion 5.1.3 It is not difficult to see that | [ϕ]pψ ↔ (ϕ → [ϕ]gψ). Hence both Plaza’s and
Gerbrandy and Groeneveld’s announcements can be expressed using arrow updates.
5.2. Cautious update and lying. We begin with a retelling of the well-known surprise
exam paradox (Clark, 2007).
A teacher tells her students that there will be a surprise exam on a week-
day next week. The students reason as follows: “The exam cannot take
place on Friday because we would know on Thursday night that the exam
would take place on Friday and it would not then be a surprise. Therefore
Thursday is the last possible day for the exam. But then the exam cannot
take place on Thursday because we would know on Wednesday night
that the exam would take place on Thursday and it would not then be
a surprise. Therefore Wednesday is the last possible day for the exam.”
Continuing their reasoning in this way, the students rule out all week-
3 A Kripke model must have a nonempty set of worlds. Therefore, properly speaking, M[ϕ]p is a
Kripke model if and only if W M[ϕ]p = ∅. Note that the truth of the antecedent M, w | ϕ of the
right-hand side of (2) guarantees this property (and hence guarantees that the structure M[ϕ]p is
in fact a Kripke model).
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days, concluding that the exam cannot take place at all. The teacher was
lying! But then, much to the students’ surprise, the exam takes place on
Tuesday.
Gerbrandy (2007) analyzed this paradox in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, showing that
the statement the teacher makes may be true. Here our focus is on another aspect of the
paradox: what happens to the students’ beliefs when they conclude that the teacher is lying?
A student who believes the teacher is lying ought not change her beliefs upon hearing
what the teacher says; otherwise, if the student does not think the teacher is lying, then
it is reasonable to accept what the teacher says. Put another way: if the student believes
the teacher’s statement to be false, then the student should ignore the statement and leave
her beliefs unchanged; otherwise, if the student believes that the teacher’s statement might
be true, then the student should trust the teacher and update her beliefs by accepting what
the teacher has said. However, in a multi-agent setting, things are a bit more complicated:
a student must not only decide whether to process the information in terms of her own
beliefs but must also take into account the fact that it is common knowledge that the other
students must make their own decisions based on their respective beliefs. This leads to
a cautious yet eager belief change policy that we call cautious updating. Steiner (2006)
first studied cautious updating as a model-changing operation in its own right. However,
cautious updates are in fact a special case of arrow updates.
DEFINITION 5.4 (Cautious Update). Given a formula ϕ, the cautious update with ϕ is the
arrow update CU(ϕ) defined by setting
CU(ϕ) def= {(3aϕ, a, ϕ) | a ∈ A } ∪
{(2a¬ϕ, a,) | a ∈ A } .
The idea is that when an agent a believes at a world w that ϕ is false, the a-arrows
leaving w should remain—thereby leaving her beliefs about ϕ unchanged at w—because
she rejects information she believes to be false. But if an agent believes at w that ϕ might
be true, then all a-arrows from w to a non-ϕ world should be deleted—thereby causing her
to accept ϕ at w—because she accepts information that she believes might be true.
While it is easy to construct an arrow update for cautious updating—indeed, the arrow
update CU(ϕ) comes quite naturally from the intuitive description of what the cautious up-
date with ϕ ought to do—it is difficult to construct a multi-agent action model for cautious
updating. Perhaps illustrative of this difficulty, we see that the action model A[CU(ϕ)]
(Definition 4.6) for the two-agent case A = {1, 2} with neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ inconsistent is
already quite complicated: see Figure 3, in which we have simplified the labeling of nodes
by omitting occurrences of formulas that are AUL-provably equivalent to other formulas
already in the set.
We note that the action model in Figure 3 contains “spurious arrows”: if M is a Kripke
model,2a¬ϕ is a conjunct of a precondition of an event e ∈ E A[CU(ϕ)], and ϕ is a conjunct
of a precondition of another event e′ ∈ E A[CU(ϕ)], then there will never be an a-arrow
from a world in M[A[CU(ϕ)]] of the form (w, e) to a world in M[A[CU(ϕ)]] of the
form (w′, e′) because M, w | preA[CU(ϕ)](e) implies M, w | 2a¬ϕ, which implies
M, v | ϕ for each v ∈ RMa (w) and hence w′ /∈ RMa (w). Therefore such “spurious arrows”
may be deleted, yielding a “reduced” action model A′[CU(ϕ)] that is update equivalent to
A[CU(ϕ)].
Cautious updating is a natural way to react to information that comes from a generally
trustworthy but occasionally faulty source: accept the information if you believe it might
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Fig. 3. The action model A[CU(ϕ)] for agents 1 (solid) and 2 (dashed), where neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is
inconsistent; node labels have been simplified.
be true and reject the information if you believe it is false. In particular, if the source
lies by asserting a false statement ϕ, then cautious updating will not lead astray those
agents who initially believe that ϕ is false: these agents will simply ignore the assertion all
together. We contrast this with the approach of van Ditmarsch et al. (2010), who propose
that agents respond to a lie that asserts a false statement ϕ by executing Gerbrandy and
Groeneveld’s public announcement operation g(ϕ): delete all arrows whose target is a ¬ϕ-
world, thereby accepting the false information ϕ without regard to one’s prior beliefs about
ϕ. One consequence of this approach is that an agent who initially believes that ϕ is false
will respond to the lie asserting ϕ by coming to believe everything (including inconsistent
statements), thereby trivializing the agent’s beliefs. Cautious updating avoids this outcome
and is therefore a better policy for responding to information coming from a trustworthy
but occasionally faulty source.4
The number of events in the arrow update CU(ϕ) grows linearly in the cardinality of A ,
whereas the action model A[CU(ϕ)] grows exponentially in the cardinality of A . In the
next section, we will show that the difference in the rates of growth between arrow updates
and their equivalent Definition 4.6 action models is sometimes unavoidable.
§6. Succinctness. Though arrow updates are no more expressive than action models
(Theorem 4.7), we will see in this section that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially
more succinct than action models. That is, we will show that there is a sequence of arrow
updates such that k-th arrow update is of size 	(k) but the smallest equivalent action model
4 Recent work on Dynamic Epistemic Logic frameworks for Belief Revision (see, e.g., Baltag &
Smets, 2007; van Benthem, 2004) would allow us to specify more subtle policies wherein an agent
tentatively accepts information she believes might be possible but will later give up this belief if
further reliable information contradicts it. However, since our focus here is on Kripke model
operations—as opposed to operations on the “plausibility models” of the DEL Belief Revision
literature—the study of connections with and applications to these more flexible belief revision
frameworks will be left for future work.
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is of size 2	(k). In order to prove this claim, we will first define the notions of the length
for formulas and of size for arrow updates and for action models.
DEFINITION 6.1 (Length). We define the function len : F ∪ U → N by letting len(ϕ)
be the number of occurrences of each symbol appearing in the expression ϕ; this includes
parentheses, brackets, and commas and, for each a ∈ A and each p ∈ P , counts each of
the expressions “2a”, “ a”, and “ p” as a single symbol. For each X ∈ F ∪ U , we call
len(X) the length of X.
DEFINITION 6.2 (Size). Given an action model A and an arrow update U, we define the
following natural-number quantities.
n(A) def= |E A| (number of events in A)
m(A) def= ∑a∈A |R¯ Aa | (number of arrows in A)
p(A) def= ∑e∈E A len(preA(e)) (length of preconditions in A)
s(A) def= m(A) + p(A) (size of A)
s((ϕ, a, ϕ′)) def= len(ϕ) + len(ϕ′) (size of (ϕ, a, ϕ′))
s((ϕ, a, ϕ′),U ) def= s((ϕ, a, ϕ′)) + s(U ) (size of (ϕ, a, ϕ′),U)
We have p(A) ≥ n(A) because len(preA(e)) ≥ 1 for each e ∈ E A. Hence s(A) ≥ n(A).
We now define a sequence {Uk}k∈N of arrow updates such that Uk has size 	(k) and the
Theorem 4.7 equivalent action model Ak
def= A[Uk] has 2	(k) events.
DEFINITION 6.3 (Uk , Ak ). Fix an agent a ∈ A and assume that P def= {pi | i ∈ N}. For
each k ∈ N, we define the arrow update Uk by setting Uk def= {(¬pi , a, pi ) | i ∈ N and i ≤
k}, and we define the action model Ak by setting Ak def= A[Uk] according to Definition 4.6.
Writing p¯i as an abbreviation for ¬pi and x0x1x2 . . . xn as an abbreviation for ∧ni=0 xi ,
the action models A0, A1, and A2 are pictured in Figure 4; note that we use dotted arrows
simply to improve the visual presentation (every arrow in Ak is an a-arrow).
LEMMA 6.4 (Update Size). For each k ∈ N, we have s(Uk) = 3k+3 and n(Ak) = 2k+1.
Proof. For each i ∈ N with i ≤ k, the triple (¬pi , a, pi ) ∈ U contributes len(¬pi ) +
len(pi ) = 3 to the size. Since k + 1 pairwise distinct triples of this form occur in U , it
follows that s(Uk) = 3k + 3. As for the size of Ak , we have ±(Uk) = {pi ,¬pi ,¬¬pi |
Fig. 4. Action models A0 (left), A1 (middle), and A2 (right) from Definition 6.3; some arrows are
dotted for visual clarity.
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i ∈ N and i ≤ k}. Hence for each i ∈ N with i ≤ k, a maximal Uk-consistent set
has exactly one of the two sets {pi ,¬¬pi } and {¬pi } as a subset. Since a maximal Uk-
consistent set is a union of k + 1 pairwise disjoint sets, each of which has one of these two
distinct forms, it follows that n(Ak) = 2k+1. 
It will be our task to show that an action model having fewer than n(Ak) states cannot
be update equivalent to Uk . For convenience, we first define an auxiliary notion of modal
equivalence between pointed Kripke models called 2a-equivalence.
DEFINITION 6.5. Given a ∈ A , to say that pointed Kripke models (M, w) and (M ′, w′)
are 2a-equivalent means that for each reduced formula ϕ, we have M, w | 2aϕ if and
only if M ′, w′ | 2aϕ.
We now prove that any action modal having fewer than n(Ak) = 2	(k) = 2	(s(Uk ))
states is not update equivalent to Uk . Since the size of an action model is no less than
the number of states in the action model, it therefore follows that no action model whose
size is less than 2	(s(Uk )) is update equivalent to Uk . Hence arrow updates are sometimes
exponentially more succinct than action models.
THEOREM 6.6 (Update Succinctness). Assume that P def= {pi | i ∈ N}. For each k ∈ N,
no action model A having n(A) < n(Ak) = 2k+1 = 2	(s(Uk )) is update equivalent to Uk.
Proof. Fix k ∈ N and a ∈ A such that a appears in Uk . Let Ck denote the k-dimensional
epistemic hypercube; that is, defining k¯ def= {i ∈ N | i ≤ k}, we let Ck be the Kripke model
defined as follows.
W Ck def= ℘(k¯)
RCkb (v)
def= W Ck for each b ∈ A
V Ck (pi )
def= {v ∈ W Ck | i ∈ v}
Note that every world w ∈ W Ck has a unique event in ew ∈ E Ak such that Ck, w |
preAk (ew).
Suppose that w1 and w2 are two different worlds in Ck . Therefore there is an i ∈ k¯ such
that, without loss of generality, w1 ∈ V Ck (pi ) and w2 ∈ V Ck (pi ). Hence (w1, ew1) ∈
RCk [Ak ]a ((w2, ew2)) because (¬pi , a, pi ) ∈ Uk . So
Ck, w2 | [Ak, E Ak ]2a¬preAk (ew1) .
Note that Ak is irreflexive, since if ew ∈ R Aka (ew), then there must be (¬p j , a, p j ) ∈ Uk
such that {¬p j , p j } ⊆ ew, contradicting the Uk-consistency of ew. Therefore (w1, ew1) ∈
RCk [Ak ]a ((w1, ew1)) and hence Ck, w1 | [Ak, E Ak ]2a¬preAk (ew1). So (Ck[Ak],
(w1, ew1)) and (Ck[Ak], (w2, ew2)) are not 2a-equivalent.
Now let (A, E) be a multi-pointed action model having n(A) < n(Ak). We shall prove
that (A, E) and Uk are not update equivalent. Proceeding, define the functions E¯ : W Ck →
℘(E) and W¯ : E → ℘(W Ck ) as follows.
E¯(w) def= {e ∈ E | (w, e) ∈ W Ck [A]}
W¯ (e) def= {w ∈ W Ck | (w, e) ∈ W Ck [A]}
If |E¯(w)| = 0 for some w ∈ W Ck , then (A, E) and Uk are not update equivalent because
Ck, w | [A, E]⊥ and Ck, w | [Uk]⊥.
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So let us assume that |E¯(w)| > 0 for each w ∈ W Ck . If there is a w ∈ W Ck , an
e1 ∈ E¯(w), an e2 ∈ E¯(w), and a reduced formula 2aϕ such that Ck[A], (w, e1) | 2aϕ
and Ck[A], (w, e2) | 2aϕ, then it follows that Ck, w | [A, E]2aϕ and Ck, w |
[A, E]¬2aϕ. But since we have either Ck, w | [Uk]2aϕ or Ck, w | [Uk]¬2aϕ, it
follows that (A, E) and Uk are not update equivalent.
So let us assume that for each w ∈ W Ck , we have not only that |E¯(w)| > 0 but also
that (Ck[A], (w, e1)) and (Ck[A], (w, e2)) are 2a-equivalent for each e1 ∈ E¯(w) and
each e2 ∈ E¯(w). Choosing an event e˜w ∈ E¯(w) for each w ∈ W Ck , it follows from the
assumption that Ck, w | [A, E]2aχ if and only if Ck, w | [A, {e˜w}]2aχ if and only if
Ck[A], (w, e˜w) | 2aχ for each reduced formula 2aχ . Since n(A) < n(Ak) = 2k+1 =
|W Ck |, there is an eˆ ∈ E A such that |W¯ (eˆ)| ≥ 2; that is, there is a w1 ∈ W¯ (eˆ) and a
w2 ∈ W¯ (eˆ) with w1 = w2. For each v ∈ W¯ (eˆ) and each v ′ ∈ W¯ (eˆ), it follows that
(w, e) ∈ RCk [A]a ((v, eˆ)) if and only if w ∈ RCka (v) and e ∈ R Aa (eˆ) if and only if e ∈ R Aa (eˆ)
if and only if w ∈ RCka (v ′) and e ∈ R Aa (eˆ) if and only if (w, e) ∈ RCk [A]a ((v ′, eˆ)). It follows
that (Ck[A], (w1, eˆ)) and (Ck[A], (w2, eˆ)) are 2a-equivalent. But we argued above that
(Ck[Ak], (w1, ew1)) and (Ck[Ak], (w2, ew2)) are not 2a-equivalent, and hence there is a
reduced formula 2aχ such that, without loss of generality, Ck[Ak], (w1, ew1) | 2aχ and
Ck[Ak], (w2, ew2) | 2aχ .5 Further, either Ck[A], (w, eˆ) | 2aχ for each w ∈ {w1, w2}
or Ck[A], (w, eˆ) | 2aχ for each w ∈ {w1, w2}. If we have that Ck[A], (w, eˆ) | 2aχ for
each w ∈ {w1, w2}, then we have Ck, w2 | [Ak, E Ak ]2aχ and Ck, w2 | [A, {eˆ}]2aχ ,
from which it follows by Theorem 4.7 and what was shown above that Ck, w2 | [Uk]2aχ
and Ck, w2 | [A, E]2aχ and hence that (A, E) and Uk are not update equivalent. On
the other hand, if we have that Ck[A], (w, eˆ) | 2aχ for each w ∈ {w1, w2}, then
we have Ck, w1 | [Ak, E Ak ]2aχ and Ck, w1 | [A, {eˆ}]2aχ , from which it follows
by Theorem 4.7 and what was shown above that Ck, w1 | [Uk]2aχ and Ck, w1 |
[A, E]2aχ and hence that (A, E) and Uk are not update equivalent. 
§7. Common knowledge. Let FC0 be the extension of the basic multi-modal language
F0 obtained by adding ordinary common knowledge operators CG for each group G ⊆ A
of agents. Extending the language FC0 by adding public announcement operators such a
Plaza’s operator [ϕ]p (Section §5) strictly increases language expressivity (Baltag et al.,
2005; Renne, 2008), which makes it impossible to prove completeness via the reduction
axiom method of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998;
Gerbrandy, 2007; Gerbrandy & Groeneveld, 1997; Plaza, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2006;
van Ditmarsch et al., 2007). Since AUL can express public announcements (Section §5),
adding AUL’s arrow update modals [U ] to the language FC0 also strictly increases lan-
guage expressivity.
In the case of adding public announcement operators to FC0 , one way to avoid the
expressive increase is to begin with a base language FC+0 built by extending F0 with
a more expressive common knowledge operators C+G such as the operators of relativized
common knowledge (Kooi & van Benthem, 2004; van Benthem et al., 2006). We wish to
do something similar for the case where we add arrow update modals [U ]: beginning with
a base language F ∗0 obtained by extending F0 with new common knowledge operators
5 The argument for the case where Ck [Ak ], (w1, ew1) | 2aχ and Ck [Ak ], (w2, ew2) | 2aχ is
obtained by interchanging w1 and w2 in the remainder of the proof.
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{U }∗—here {U }∗ is viewed not as a belief change operator but instead as a certain kind of
common knowledge operator that we define below—we will see that the further addition
of update modals [U ] does not increase language expressivity. For brevity, we will ap-
proach this study by beginning with the full language F ∗ obtained by extending F0 with
both common knowledge operators {U }∗ and belief-changing update modals [U ]. After
defining a semantics for this language, we will develop a sound and complete axiomatics
for the validities of the language with respect to the semantics. On the way to proving
completeness, we will prove (in Theorem 7.8) that the full language F ∗ and the fragment
F ∗0 obtained by omitting belief-changing update modals [U ] are equally expressive.
DEFINITION 7.1 (AUL∗ Language). The grammar G ∗ is defined as follows.
ϕ ::= ⊥ |  | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 2aϕ | [U ]ϕ | {U }∗ϕ
U ::= (ϕ, a, ϕ) | (ϕ, a, ϕ), U
p ∈ P , a ∈ A
Expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G ∗ are called AUL∗-formulas;
we let F ∗ denote the set of AUL∗-formulas. Expressions built using U as a start symbol
in grammar G ∗ are called AUL∗-arrow updates; we let U ∗ denote the set of AUL∗-arrow
updates. We adopt conventions and terminology similar to those established for the AUL
language (Definition 2.2).
DEFINITION 7.2 (AUL∗ Semantics). We extend the AUL semantics from Definition 2.4 as
follows.
M, w | {U }∗ϕ iff M, v | ϕ for each v ∈ (RMU )∗(w)
RMU (v)
def= {v ′ ∈ W M | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U :
(M, v | ϕ, v ′ ∈ RMa (v), and M, v ′ | ϕ′)}
Here (RMU )
∗ denotes the reflexive−transitive closure case of RMU . F ∗-validity is defined as
is F -validity (Definition 2.4). Given an AUL∗-arrow update U ∈ U ∗ and a Kripke model
M, a U -path in M is a finite nonempty sequence 〈wi 〉ni=0 of worlds in M satisfying the
property that wi+1 ∈ RMU (wi ) for each i ∈ N with i < n. We say that the U-path 〈wi 〉ni=0
in M begins at w0, ends at wn, and is from w0 to wn. A step in a U-path 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a
subsequence 〈w j , w j+1〉 obtained by choosing some j ∈ N satisfying 0 ≤ j < n.
The semantics of ordinary common knowledge CG among a nonempty group G ⊆ A
is given by defining M, w | CGϕ to mean that M, v | ϕ for each v ∈ (RMa )∗(w) (Fagin
et al., 1995). Since we have that
| CGϕ ↔ {(, a,) | a ∈ G}∗ϕ ,
it follows that ordinary common knowledge is expressible in the language of AUL∗.
Let M be a Kripke model. Given a world w ∈ W M , a formula ϕ, and a nonempty group
G ⊆ A , a ϕ-G-path from w is a finite nonempty sequence 〈wi 〉ni=0 of worlds in M such
that w0
def= w, that n ≥ 1, that wi+1 ∈ ⋃a∈G RMa (wi ) for each i < n, and that M, wi | ϕ
for each i ≤ n. A ϕ-G-path 〈wi 〉ni=0 is said to end on wn . The semantics of relativized
common knowledge CG(ϕ,ψ) among a nonempty group G ⊆ A is given by defining
M, w | CG(ϕ,ψ) to mean that M, v | ψ for each v ∈ W M such that there is a ϕ-G-path
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2a(ϕ → {(, a, ϕ) | a ∈ G}∗ψ) ,
it follows that relativized common knowledge is expressible in the language of AUL∗.
DEFINITION 7.3 ({U }ψ , U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)). Let U be an AUL∗-arrow update and a ∈ A
be an agent. Let ψ , ψ ′, χ , and χ ′ be AUL∗-formulas. We define the expressions {U }ψ and
U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′) as follows.




(ϕ → 2b(ϕ′ → ψ)) .
• U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′) is the AUL∗-arrow update defined by setting
U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′) def= (U − {(ψ, a, χ)}) ∪ {(ψ ′, a, χ ′)} .
DEFINITION 7.4 (AUL∗ Theory). The axiomatic theory AUL∗ is defined in Table 3. We
write AUL∗  ϕ (or sometimes ∗ ϕ) to mean that the AUL∗-formula ϕ is derivable in
the axiomatic theory AUL∗; the negation of AUL∗  ϕ is written AUL∗  ϕ (or sometimes

∗ ϕ).
LEMMA 7.5. Let M be a Kripke model and 〈wi 〉ni=0 be a finite nonempty sequence of
worlds in M. Then 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a U ′-path in M ∗ U if and only if 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a (U ◦ U ′)-path
in M.
Proof. Assume that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a U ′-path in M ∗ U . This means that for each step〈wi , wi+1〉 in 〈wi 〉ni=0, there exists a (ϕi , ai , ϕ′i ) ∈ U ′ such that M ∗ U, wi | ϕi (equiva-
lently: M, wi | [U ]ϕi ), that wi+1 ∈ RM∗Uai (wi ), and that M∗U, wi+1 | ϕ′i (equivalently:
M, wi+1 | [U ]ϕ′i ). But to have wi+1 ∈ RM∗Uai (wi ) means that there exists a (ψi , ai , ψ ′i ) ∈
AXIOM SCHEMES
AUL. Arrow Update Logic AUL
U6. [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ ↔ {U ◦ U ′}∗[U ]ϕ
UK. {U }∗(ϕ → ψ) → ({U }∗ϕ → {U }∗ψ)
MIX. {U }∗ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ {U }{U }∗ϕ)
IND. {U }∗(ϕ → {U }ϕ) → (ϕ → {U }∗ϕ)
RULES












ψ → ψ ′ χ → χ ′
{U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)}∗ϕ → {U }∗ϕ
(*W)
Table 3. The theory AUL∗
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U such that M, wi | ψi , that wi+1 ∈ RMai (wi ), and that M, wi+1 | ψ ′i . Hence for each
step 〈wi , wi+1〉 in 〈wi 〉ni=0, there exists a (ψi , ai , ψ ′i ) ∈ U and a (ϕi , ai , ϕ′i ) ∈ U such
that M, wi | ψi ∧ [U ]ϕi , that wi+1 ∈ RMai (wi ), and that M, wi+1 | ψ ′i ∧ [U ]ϕ′i . But
by the definition of U ◦ U ′ (Definition 3.1), this is what it means to say that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a
(U ◦ U ′)-path in M . 
THEOREM 7.6 (AUL∗ Soundness). AUL∗  ϕ implies | ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F ∗.
Proof. By induction on the length of derivation in AUL∗. We restrict our attention
to the base case for Axiom U6 and the induction case for Rule *W. The other cases
are straightforward adaptations of the arguments for ordinary common knowledge (Fagin
et al., 1995).
Proceeding, we prove that Axiom U6 is valid. For the left-to-right direction, assume that
M, w | [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ and that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a (U ◦ U ′)-path in M that begins at w. It follows
by Lemma 7.5 that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a U ′-path in M ∗ U that begins at w and therefore that
M ∗U, wn | ϕ. Hence M, wn | [U ]ϕ for each (U ◦U ′)-path 〈wi 〉ni=0 in M that begins at
w. But this is what it means to have M, w | {U ◦U ′}∗[U ]ϕ. For the right-to-left direction,
assume that M, w | {U ◦ U ′}∗[U ]ψ and that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a U ′-path in M ∗ U that begins
at w. It follows by Lemma 7.5 that 〈wi 〉ni=0 is a (U ◦ U ′)-path in M that begins at w and
therefore that M, w | [U ]ϕ. Hence M ∗ U, wn | ϕ for each U ′-path 〈wi 〉ni=0 in M ∗ U
that begins at w. But this is what it means to have M, w | [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ. This completes the
proof that Axiom U6 is valid.
Let us now show that Rule *W is validity preserving. Proceeding, assume that | ψ →
ψ ′ and | χ → χ ′. We wish to argue that | {U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)}∗ϕ → {U }∗ϕ. So
let (M, w) be an arbitrary pointed Kripke model satisfying the property that M, w |
{U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)}∗ϕ. It follows that for each U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)-path 〈wi 〉ni=0 in M that
begins at w, we have that M, wn | ϕ. But since | ψ → ψ ′ and | χ → χ ′, it follows
that every U -path in M is also a U (ψ/ψ ′, a, χ/χ ′)-path in M . Hence M, w | {U }∗ϕ.
Since M was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Rule *W is validity preserving. 
DEFINITION 7.7 (AUL∗ Complexity). We define c : (F ∗ ∪ U ∗) → N by adding the
following to the equations in Definition 3.4.
c({U }∗ϕ) def= 2 + c(U ) + c(ϕ)
For each X ∈ F ∗ ∪ U ∗, the number c(X) is called the complexity of X.
THEOREM 7.8 (AUL∗ Reduction). For each ϕ ∈ F ∗, there is a reduced ϕ◦ ∈ F ∗ such
that AUL∗  ϕ ↔ ϕ◦.
Proof. We add the following equations to those in Table 2.
r({U }∗ϕ) def= {r(U )}∗r(ϕ)
r([U ]{U ′}∗ϕ) def= {r(U ◦ U ′)}∗r([U ]ϕ)
r((ϕ, a, ϕ′)) def= (r(ϕ), a, r(ϕ′))
r((ϕ, a, ϕ′),U ) def= (r(ϕ), a, r(ϕ′)), r(U )
As in the proof of AUL Reduction (Theorem 3.5), we then argue that the full collection of
equations defines a function r : F ∗ → F ∗. To see that these equations are complexity
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respecting, we note that we have c(U ◦ U ′) ≤ 2 + c(U ) · c(U ′) + 2 · c(U ′) by what
was shown in the proof of AUL Reduction (Theorem 3.5). Further, since we have that
c([U ]ϕ) = c(U ) · c(ϕ) + 2 · c(ϕ) and that c([U ]{U ′}∗ϕ) = c(U ) · 2 + c(U ) · c(U ′) +
c(U ) · c(ϕ) + 4 + 2 · c(U ′) + 2 · c(ϕ), it follows that c([U ]{U ′}∗ϕ) > c(U ◦ U ′) and
c([U ]{U ′}∗ϕ) > c([U ]ϕ). The equations are therefore complexity respecting. So to prove
the statement of the theorem, one then argues by induction on the complexity k of AUL∗-
formulas that for each formula θ having c(θ) ≤ k, it follows that ∗ θ ↔ r(θ). The
argument is broken up into a number of cases, one for each of the forms of an AUL∗-
formula to which r is applied on the left side of an equation from either Table 2 or from
the above-listed additions to Table 2. Let us check the induction cases for AUL∗-formulas
of the form {U }∗ϕ and for AUL∗-formulas of the form [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ. The other cases are
straightforward.
Proceeding, we prove that ∗ {U }∗ϕ ↔ r({U }∗ϕ). First, we have ∗ ϕ ↔ r(ϕ) by the
induction hypothesis (which may be applied by the fact that r : F ∗ → F ∗ is complexity
respecting). Applying modal reasoning, it follows that ∗ {U }∗ϕ ↔ {U }∗r(ϕ). But since
we have that ∗ {U }∗r(ϕ) ↔ {r(U )}∗r(ϕ) by repeated use of Rule *W and the induction
hypothesis, the result follows.
Finally, we prove that ∗ [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ ↔ r([U ]{U ′}∗ϕ). First, we have that ∗ [U ]{U ′}∗
ϕ ↔ {U ◦ U ′}∗[U ]ϕ by Axiom U6. Second, it follows by the induction hypothesis (which
is applicable because r : F ∗ → F ∗ is complexity respecting) that ∗ [U ]ϕ ↔ r([U ]ϕ)
and hence that ∗ {U ◦ U ′}∗[U ]ϕ ↔ {U ◦ U ′}∗r([U ]ϕ) by modal reasoning. Hence we
have shown that ∗ [U ]{U ′}∗ϕ ↔ {U ◦ U ′}∗r([U ]ϕ). But since we have that ∗ {U ◦
U ′}∗r([U ]ϕ) ↔ {r(U ◦ U ′)}∗r([U ]ϕ) by repeated use of Rule *W and the induction
hypothesis, the result follows. 
THEOREM 7.9 (AUL∗ Completeness). | ϕ implies AUL∗  ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F ∗.
Proof. As in the proof of AUL Completeness (Theorem 3.6), though making use of AUL∗
Soundness (Theorem 7.6) and AUL∗ Reduction (Theorem 7.8). Note that completeness of
the reduced fragment of AUL∗ follows by a standard Fischer−Ladner-style finite model
construction (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007, sec. 7.3).6 
§8. Conclusion. We presented the theory AUL of Arrow Update Logic, a multi-agent
doxastic theory for reasoning about belief changes brought about by epistemic arrow-
eliminating operations called arrow updates. We provided a sound and complete axiom-
atization of AUL along with two examples of AUL-describable belief changes: public
announcements (both Plaza’s and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld’s) and cautious updating.
We proved that every belief- changing operation expressible using an arrow update U is
expressible using the action model A[U ] of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. However, using
action models can be expensive: we proved that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially
more succinct than action models in expressing belief changes. These results give us
half of the story about the relationship between arrow updates and action models: arrow
updates can be expressed using action models but it is sometimes exponentially more
6 The reduced fragment of AUL∗ is the theory AUL∗0 obtained from AUL∗ by eliminating all axioms
and rules that contain nonreduced formulas. The language of AUL∗0 consists of the set of reduced
AUL∗-formulas.
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expensive to do so. What remains for future work is to determine the other half of the
story: which action models are expressible using arrow updates, and are action models
sometimes exponentially more succinct than arrow updates?
Toward the end of this paper, we presented the theory AUL∗ of AUL with common
knowledge operators {U }∗. We proved that the language F ∗0 obtained by adding these
common knowledge operators to the basic multi-modal language F0 is just as expressive
as the language F ∗ obtained by further extending F ∗0 by adding arrow update modals
[U ] (Theorem 7.8). While we showed that our common knowledge operators {U }∗ can
express both ordinary and relativized common knowledge, it is an open question whether
this expressive relationship holds the other way around (though we suspect that in each
case it does not).
While the action models of DEL generalize Plaza’s world-eliminating public announce-
ments, the arrow updates of AUL generalize Gerbrandy and Groeneveld’s arrow-eliminating
public announcements, though the AUL generalization comes with an assumption that the
way each of the agents responds to incoming information is common knowledge among the
agents. In Kooi & Renne (2011), we study the theory of Generalized Arrow Update Logic
(GAUL), which drops this assumption. We achieve this by expanding the arrow specifica-
tions (ϕ, a, ϕ′) of AUL in a way that allows us to say that an a-arrow elimination happens
privately for some subgroup of agents. The resulting generalized arrow updates of GAUL
therefore have a more direct connection with Dynamic Epistemic Logic’s action models:
each generalized arrow update is update equivalent to an action model and each action
model is update equivalent to a generalized arrow update. But mutual expressivity does
not come for free. In particular, generalized arrow updates are at worst polyexponentially
less succinct than action models, though this improves to being at worst less succinct if
the action models have purely epistemic preconditions (i.e., preconditions not containing
action models) or if we allow generalized arrow updates to have target conditions in the
language of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Further, we showed that generalized arrow updates
are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. See Kooi & Renne (2011)
for details. Though GAUL allows us to drop the common knowledge assumption present in
AUL, we still have not identified the exact update-expressive relationship between action
models and AUL arrow updates, an important question for future research.
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